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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 13-4309
________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MICHAEL WILKERSON,
Appellant
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-11-cr-00596-001)
District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 29, 2014
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 15, 2014)
________________
OPINION
________________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Following a bench trial, Appellant Michael Wilkerson was convicted of bank
fraud, 18 U.S.C § 1344, loan fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1014, and aiding and abetting those
offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 2. Wilkerson moved for retrial after coming across new evidence

that he said showed that the federally insured institution named in the Indictment was not
the object of the fraudulent scheme the Government alleged. The District Court
disagreed. Wilkerson appeals that judgment.1 We agree with the District Court and
affirm.
I.
Wilkerson eyed a number of new construction homes in Eastern Pennsylvania to
purchase as investments. Standing in his way was his inadequate credit score. To fix that
problem, Wilkerson recruited a group of six individuals to serve as his “straw
purchasers.” The deal was that, in exchange for $15,000 each, the six individuals would
submit mortgage applications in connection with the purchase of the homes Wilkerson
sought.
The sales agreement for each of the homes listed the seller as the actual
homebuilder and the buyer as Wilkerson’s company, Agape Development Company
(“Agape”). Each of the agreements also provided for the assignment from Agape to the
straw purchaser of the home. The price of the assignment was almost double the initial
sales price. To make sure the straw purchasers received the financing they needed,
Wilkerson looked to a loan officer at American Group Mortgage (“AGM”), a mortgage
brokerage.
The loan officer played a crucial role in Wilkerson’s scheme. She falsified the
straw purchasers’ statements of income and assets in their loan applications. She
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The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Our
jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2

misrepresented that the homes would be used as the borrowers’ primary residences and
that of the purchasers would be using their own funds to make the down payment. And,
to make it all come together, she arranged for appraisers (all of whom were approved by
Chase Manhattan Bank (“Chase Manhattan”)) to meet with Wilkerson and appraise each
of the properties. The homes were appraised for values that matched the price at which
the straw purchasers were buying the homes rather than the price at which they were
being sold to Agape.
The loan officer then submitted the loan applications, sales agreements, and
appraisals to Chase Manhattan—the underwriter for AGM’s loans—for its approval.
Relying on the representations made in the loan applications and the appraisals, Chase
Manhattan agreed to fund the loans.
At closing, the settlement agent prepared three checks: one made payable to the
actual home builder and two made payable to Agape. Wilkerson, with the help of his
wife, disguised some of the money obtained at closing as the down payment for each of
the homes. This made it appear that the closing conditions had been met. Wilkerson kept
the balance of the funds received from Chase Manhattan. His fraudulent scheme lasted
only as long as he was able to make the mortgage payments on the seven properties.
Predictably, he defaulted on all the loans in December 2007.
Wilkerson was indicted by a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
He was charged with one count of bank fraud, five counts of loan fraud, and aiding and
abetting those offenses. He proceeded without a jury and was convicted on all counts.
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Wilkerson moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. He
contended that the Government failed to prove that Chase Manhattan—a financial
institution insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)—had any
direct involvement with the loans at issue in this case. After reopening the record and
hearing additional evidence, the District Court denied Wilkerson’s motion. He was
sentenced to 170 months in prison and a five-year term of supervised release. He was
also ordered to pay $1,353,111.93 in restitution and a $600 special assessment.
II.
Both the bank and loan fraud statutes make criminal a fraud directed against a
federally insured bank. Wilkerson first contends the Government did not advance
sufficient evidence to satisfy the jurisdictional element of either statute, which requires
that a FDIC-insured bank be the object—either directly or indirectly—of the fraudulent
scheme. According to Wilkerson, the fraud was directed at AGM rather than FDICinsured Chase Manhattan, as the loans were “fully funded and closed at settlement” by
AGM.
We disagree. AGM was merely an instrument through which Wilkerson obtained
money from Chase Manhattan. AGM conducted no review of any of the straw
purchasers’ loan applications. Nor did it intend to fund any of the loans on its own. It
agreed to provide funds from its warehouse line only after securing Chase Manhattan’s
direct approval. Thus, “the loan—although formally made by [AGM]—was from the
outset part of an integrated transaction, the first step of which was dependent on approval
by [Chase Manhattan], and the pre-planned second step of which was a transfer of the
4

mortgage to [Chase Manhattan] itself.” United States v. Edelkind, 467 F.3d 791, 798 (1st
Cir. 2006). In light of Chase Manhattan’s central role in funding the loans, in sharp
contrast to AGM’s role as middleman, a rational trier of fact could have found that
Wilkerson’s fraud was directed at Chase Manhattan rather than AGM.
Separately, but equally a problem, Wilkerson insists that the Government named
the wrong victim in the Indictment. He contends that the real victim was JP Morgan
Chase Bank, N.A.—the entity that filed a civil lawsuit against Wilkerson to recover the
funds he improperly received—rather than Chase Manhattan, as the Government alleged
in the Indictment. Thus, the Government failed to introduce sufficient evidence that the
federally insured institution named in the Indictment was the defrauded entity.
Nothing of the sort occurred here. At trial, the Government and Wilkerson
stipulated that Chase Manhattan was a FDIC-insured institution that had been issued
Certificate Number 628 by the FDIC. Later, when the District Court allowed the
reopening of evidence, the Government’s witness confirmed that Chase Manhattan and
JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.—both of which are insured under Certificate Number
628—were one and the same as a result of a 2001 merger. Thus, any reference to Chase
Manhattan in the Indictment or at trial was effectively a reference to JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A.
For these reasons, we affirm.
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